Pooled steganalysis in JPEG: how to deal with the spreading strategy?

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December 11, 2019

WIFS'2019, IEEE International Workshop on Information Forensics and Security, December 9-12, 2019, Delft, The Netherlands.

Outline

Steganography / Steganalysis



Batch steganography / Pooled steganalysis



Alice:

- spreads a message $\mathbf{m} \in \{0,1\}^{|m|}$,
- in multiple covers,
- using a strategy $s \in \mathcal{S}$.

A. D. Ker, "Batch steganography and pooled steganalysis," in IH'06

Examples of possible spreading strategies



The 6 evaluated spreading strategies in this paper,
$\mathcal{S} = \{IMS, DeLS, DiLS, Greedy, Linear, and\ Uses - \beta\}$

Pooled steganalysis: how to deal with the spreading strategy?



Many possibilities for Alice to spread the message;
What about Eve, the steganalyst?

Pooled steganalysis: how to deal with the spreading strategy?



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Recent approaches opt for **pooling** individual scores (more general)

Pooled steganalysis: how to deal with the spreading strategy?



Many possibilities for Alice to spread the message;
What about Eve, the steganalyst?

Recent approaches opt for **pooling** individual scores (more general)

Let us denote, f, a **Single Image Detector (SID)**;
For example a payload predictor (quantitative steganalysis):

$$f : \mathbb{R}^{r \times c} \rightarrow \mathbb{R}^{+}$$

Pooled steganalysis: how to deal with the spreading strategy?



Many possibilities for Alice to spread the message;
What about Eve, the steganalyst?

Recent approaches opt for **pooling** individual scores



Recent studies

- [1] Hypothesis: *Eve does not know the spreading strategy*
  $\Rightarrow$ best pooling strategy = *averaging* the individual scores
- [2] Hypothesis: *Eve does know the spreading strategy*
  $\Rightarrow$ knowledge of the strategy = improves steganalysis results.
- [3] Hypothesis: *Eve does know the spreading strategy*
  $\Rightarrow$ knowledge of the strategy = improves steganalysis results.

- [1] R. Cogranne, "A sequential method for online steganalysis," in WIFS'2015.
- [2] T. Pevný and I. Nikolaev, "Optimizing pooling function for pooled steganalysis," in WIFS'2015.
- [3] R. Cogranne, V. Sedighi, and J. J. Fridrich, "Practical strategies for content-adaptive batch steganography and pooled steganalysis," in ICASSP'2017.

The addressed question



Hypothesis: *Eve does not know the spreading strategy*.

Can Eve "do better" than averaging the individual scores?

Outline

T. Pevny and I. Nikolaev general architecture



Given a vector of SID scores $\mathbf{z} = \{f(x_1), ..., f(x_b)\}$:

$$\mathbf{h} = \left[\frac{1}{b} \sum_{f(x_i) \in z} k(f(x_i), c_1), \ \ldots \ , \ \frac{1}{b} \sum_{f(x_i) \in z} k(f(x_i), c_p) \right],$$

with $\{c_i\}_{i=1}^{p}$ a set of equally spaced real positive values, and $k(x, y) = exp(-\gamma ||x - y||^2))$.

T. Pevny and I. Nikolaev general architecture



- Histogram $\rightarrow$ can treat a bag of any dimension,
- Histogram $\rightarrow$ invariant to the sequential order in the bag.

The Single Image Detector (SID)

- Note: Alice embeds using J-UNIWARD (512×512 BossBase1.01 QF=75).
- **Quantitative** steganalysis in JPEG [1].
- GFR cleaned and normalized:
  - Gabor Features Residuals (GFR) of dimension 17 000 [2],
  - Clean cleaned from NaN values and from constant values → reduced to 16 750,
  - Normalize using random conditioning [3].

Learning: 5 000 covers + 5 000 stego per payload size ($\{0.1, 0.2, 0.3, 0.4, 0.5, 0.6, 0.7, 0.8, 0.9, 1\}$ bpc).

- [1] J. Kodovský and J. J. Fridrich, "Quantitative steganalysis using rich models," in EI'2013 MWSF.
- [2] X. Song, F. Liu, C. Yang, X. Luo, and Y. Zhang, "Steganalysis of adaptive JPEG steganography using 2d gabor filters," in IH&MMSec'2015.
- [3] M. Boroumand and J. J. Fridrich, "Nonlinear feature normalization in steganalysis," in IH&MMSec 2017.
- Note: M. Chen, M. Boroumand, and J. J. Fridrich, "Deep learning regressors for quantitative steganalysis," in EI'2018 MWSF, is more efficient.

Outline

Alice: Batch spreading strategies



1. **Greedy strategy:** spreading into as few covers as possible.
2. **Linear strategy:** spreading evenly.
3. *Uses-*β **strategy:** spreading evenly across a fraction of covers.
4. **IMS strategy:** spreading in an unique artificial image.
5. **DeLS strategy:** spreading at the same deflection coefficient (MiPod model).
6. **DiLS strategy:** spreading at the same distortion.

Eve: Pooling strategies



- g_{clair}: Eve (**clairvoyant**) *knows* the spreading strategy. SVM learned on the known strategy $s \in \mathcal{S}$.
- g_{disc}: Eve (**discriminative**) *does not know* the spreading strategy. SVM learned on all the strategies $\mathcal{S}$.
- g_{max}: Maximum function AND τ_{max} by minimizing P_e over $\mathcal{S}$.
- g_{mean}: Average function AND τ_{min} by minimizing P_e over $\mathcal{S}$.

Bags for the learning and for the test



g_{clair} (clairvoyant) learning:

- Choose **one** bag size $b \in \mathcal{B} = \{2, 4, 6, 10, 20, 50, 100, 200\}$,
- Choose **one** spreading strategies $s \in \mathcal{S}$,
- Generate 5 000 cover bags and 5 000 stego bags (0.1 bp**t**c).

g_{clair} testing:

- Choose **the same** bag size b,
- Choose **the same** spreading strategies s,
- Generate 5 000 cover bags and 5 000 stego bags (0.1 bp**t**c).

Bags for the learning and for the test



g_{disc} (discriminative) , g_{max}, and g_{mean} learning:

- Choose **one** bag size $b \in \mathcal{B} = \{2, 4, 6, 10, 20, 50, 100, 200\}$,
- Choose **all** the spreading strategies from $\mathcal{S}$,
- Generate 5 000 cover bags and 5 000 stego bags.
  833 bags per strategy (0.1 bp**t**c).

g_{disc} (discriminative) , g_{max}, and g_{mean} testing:

- Choose **the same** bag size b,
- Choose **one** spreading strategies $s \in \mathcal{S}$ (**unknown from Eve**),
- Generate 5 000 cover bags and 5 000 stego bags (0.1 bp**t**c).

Outline

Alice: Spreading strategies comparison (Eve clairvoyant)



Figure: Spreading strategies comparison in the *clairvoyant* case (10 runs).

Eve: Pooling function comparisons



Figure: Pooled steganalysis comparison (10 runs).

Outline

Conclusions

Up-to-date algorithms:

- modern embedding (J-Uniward),
- 6 spreading strategies (3 moderns),
- modern (generic) pooling architecture.

$\rightarrow$ Coherent results with past papers.

The take away messages:

- For Alice: DeLS is a really interesting spreading strategy.
- For Eve: g_{disc} pooling can improve the detectability if Eve does not know the spreading strategy.

To be continued...

Future:

- DeLS with a DCT model,
- Robustness to the bag size variation
  (learn only once with various size),
- Robustness to the mismatch in the spreading strategy
  (uses a different strategy in the test; Examples in [1]),
- Minimize the Pe (for g_{disc}) differently for each strategy,
- Use something more powerful than an SVM,
- Extend to deep learning,
- Go toward a simulation of a game (GAN philosophy),

[1] X. Liao, J. Yin, "Two Embedding Strategies for Payload Distribution in Multiple Images Steganography", in ICASSP'2018.